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NOTES
RENUNCIATION OF A LEGACY OR DEVISE AS A
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
When an insolvent debtor files a petition in bankruptcy under the
federal Bankruptcy Act,' a trustee is appointed to gather the debtor's
assets and distribute the proceeds to his creditors.2 If the debtor ac-
quires property as a beneficiary under a will prior to or during the bank-
ruptcy proceedings, the property received can be claimed by the trustee.'
However, the common law rule is that the beneficiary of a will can re-
nounce a devise or a legacy' and that the renunciation relates back to
the death of the testator making the gift void from the beginning.5
Thus, to prevent seizure of these assets by the trustee, the debtor might
be inclined to renounce the testamentary gift and have it pass to the next
successor in interest, particularly if the next successor is a relative or a
member of the debtor's immediate family. The question addressed in this
note is whether a renunciation by an insolvent debtor which has the effect
of avoiding his creditors can be set aside by the trustee in bankruptcy as
a fraudulent transfer.
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS DEFINED
Section 67(d) (2) of the Bankruptcy Acte deals with transfers made
1. Bankruptcy Act §§ 1-703, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1970) [hereinafter referred to
as the Act].
2. Bankruptcy Act § 47, 11 U.S.C. § 75 (1970).
3. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970).
4. In re Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 108 P.2d 401 (1940); In re Stone, 132 Ia.
136, 109 N.W. 455 (1906) ; Garfield v. White, 326 Mass. 20, 92 N.E.2d 575 (1950).
5. Some courts have held that the title is presumed to vest at the death of the
testator but the renunciation relates back to make the gift void from the beginning.
See Strom v. Wood, 100 Kan. 556, 164 P. 1100 (1917) ; Bradford v. Calhoun, 120 Tenn.
53, 109 S.W. 502 (1908). Others have held that the testamentary gift never vested in
the beneficiary so that relation back is not necessary. See Perkins v. Isley, 224 N.C. 793,
32 S.E.2d 588 (1945). See generally 6 W. BowE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 49.4
(1962) [hereinafter cited as PAGE ON WILLS].
6. 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (2) (1970), which states in part:
Every transfer made and every obligation incurred by a debtor within one
year prior to the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding under this title by
or against him is fraudulent (a) as to creditors existing at the time of such
transfer or obligation, if made or incurred without fair consideration by a debtor
who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent, without regard to his actual in-
tent; . . . or (d) as to then existing and future creditors if made or incurred
with actual intent as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay,
or defraud either existing or future creditors.
Id. Property which vests in the bankrupt by inheritance, legacy, or devise after the
bankruptcy petition is filed is covered by § 70(a), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970). See note
69 infra.
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for the purpose of defeating creditors. This section states that if an in-
solvent debtor makes a fraudulent transfer of property or-an interest in
property within one year prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy,
the transfer is voidable and the trustee can include the property in the
bankrupt's estate for distribution to his creditors. The transfer is
fraudulent under § 67(d) (2) if (1) it is made with actual intent to de-
fraud creditors, or (2) the 4ebtor receives no consideration for mak-
ing the transfer and the debtor is insolvent at the time of the transfer
or is rendered insolvent because of the transfer.7
The term "transfer," as defined for purposes of t, Bankruptcy
Act in § 1 (30),8 includes nearly every method by which a person can
dispose of property or an interest in property. The broad wording of
this section leaves the meaning of the term virtually unrestricted.
Further, in Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co.,' the United States
Supreme Court refused to approve an interpretation which would
narrow the scope of § 1(30). In Pirie, a creditor who had received
monetary payments from an insolvent debtor argued that money was
not "property" and thus could not be the subject of a transfer within
the meaning of § 1(30). The Court held:
[A] transfer of property includes the giving or conveying
[of] anything of value-anything which has debt-paying or
debt-securing power.
S. .All technicality and narrowness of meaning is pre-
cluded. The word is used in its most comprehensive sense, and
is intended to include every means and manner by which property
can pass from the ownership and possession of another, and by
7. 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (2) (1970). See generally 4 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
67.29, at 472 (14th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as CoLrIER]..
The four sections of § 67(d) (2) are virtually identical to the UIIFORm FRAUDu-
LENT CONVEYANCE AcT §§ 4-7. This act has been adopted by statute in about half of the
states. The Uniform Act has its origin in the Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances of 13
Elizabeth, 13 Eliz. ch. 5 (1570), which voided any conveyance made with "an intent to
hinder, delay, and defraud creditors." 4 COLLIER, supra, 1 67.29.
8. "Transfer" shall include the sale and every other and different mode, direct
or indirect, of disposing of or of parting with property or with an interest there-
in or with the possession thereof or of fixing a lien upon property or upon an
interest therein, absolutely or conditionally, voluntarily or involuntarily, by or
without judicial proceedings, as a conveyance, sale, assignment, payment, pledge,
mortgage, lien, encumbrance, gift, security, or otherwise; the retention of a
security title to property delivered to a debtor shall be deemed a transfer suf-
fered by such debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1970).
9. 182 U.S. 438 (1901).
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which the result forbidden by the statute may be accomp-
lished . . ..
Since a property interest must exist before a transfer can be made,
however, a court may avoid the isstue of whether a voidable transfer
occurred by determining that the debtor never acquired any property
interest. In Hoecker v. United Bank," the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit used this approach in holding that a renuncia-
tion of a testamentary gift by an insolvent debtor was not a fraudulent
transfer under § 67(d)(2).
HOECKER V. UNITED BANK
In Hoecker, a father devised and bequeathed all of his property to
his two sons, Joseph and Anthony. The will provided that if either of
the two sons predeceased the father, then that son's share would pass to
his children, per stirpes. Five months after the father's death, Anthony
disclaimed irrevocably the share of the property he received under the
will. He received no consideration for the renunciation. At the time of
the disclaimer, there were creditors who had provable claims against
Anthony, and without his share of the decedent's property he was in-
solvent. Within one year after renouncing, Anthony filed a voluntary
petition in bankruptcy.2
The trustee in bankruptcy argued that Anthony's disclaimer met
the requirements of a voidable fraudulent transfer under § 67(d) (2),"
and that his share of the testamentary property should be included in
his bankruptcy estate. However, the court concluded that it was bound
by the applicable state law on the testamentary disposition of property
-a Colorado statute'4 making the renunciation of a testamentary gift
retroactive to the testator's death and distributing the property as
though the disclaimant had predeceased the testator. The court inferred
from this statute that the Colorado legislature intended that the
property would not vest in the disclaimant but rather would pass directly
from the testator to the next designated beneficiaries. Since the bankrupt
thus had no vested interest in the property, the court concluded that his
disclaimer did not operate as a transfer. There was, therefore, no viola-
tion of § 67(d) (2) of the Bankruptcy Act and the trustee was not allowed
to claim the renounced property. 5
10. Id. at 443-44 (emphasis added).
11. 476 F.2d 838 (10th Cir. 1973), aff'g 334 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Colo. 1971).
12. Id. at 839.
13. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
14. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-5-43 (1965).
15. 476 F.2d at 839-41.
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Judge Holloway dissented. He considered the meaning of transfer
to be a federal question since it involved a federal statute requiring uni-
form application throughout the United States. 6 While he agreed that
state law would control on the question of whether or not the property
vested, he did not see this as the material issue. Regardless of the state
rule on vesting, the right of the beneficiary to accept or renounce gave
him the power to designate whether he or someone else would receive
the property. Judge Holloway deemed this power over the disposition
of property to be an interest in the property. He considered the exercise
of the power by renunciation to be a "mode, direct or indirect," 7 of dis-
posing of the interest and hence a transfer within the meaning of § 1 (30)
of the Act as expanded by Pire v. Chicago Title & Trumt Co. 8  The
trustee should, therefore, be allowed to claim the property under §
67(d) (2).
The distinction between the majority and dissent in Hoecker turned
on the issue of whether the existence of a transferable interest in property
is to be determined by federal bankruptcy law or by state property law.
This issup constitutes the focus of the next section.
THE FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICT
As a general rule, federal courts will apply state law when the issues
of a case do not present a substantial need for federal law to predominate."
However, the Supreme Court has firmly established that state law is not
always controlling."0 There are two interrelated reasons why a federal rule
16. Id. at 842. The necessity for a uniform application of the Bankruptcy Act was
expressed by the Supreme Court in McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365, 369-70
(1945). See also text accompanying notes 41-43 in'ra.
17. Judge Holloway stated:
The Colorado statute recognizes that there is a limited power in the dis-
claimant to control the passing of his interest in the property during the six-
months' period after the will is admitted to probate, as well as later. And if the
right of disclaiming is then exercised ". . . such property or beneficial interest
so disclaimed shall pass . . ." as if he had predeceased the decedent ....
Thus under state law there is a power which seems to me to be a "mode, direct
or indirect," of disposing [of] or parting with his interest in the property and
hence a transfer.
476 F.2d at 842.
18. 182 U.S. 438 (1901) ; see text accompanying notes 8-10 supra.
19. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Also, the Rules of Decision Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970), provides:
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the
United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be re-
garded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in
cases where they apply.
Id. See also Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1013 (1953),
where the author strongly argues that bankruptcy courts should apply state law in deal-
ing with actions under the federal Bankruptcy Act.
20. In Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942), which was not
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should be adopted to deal with a debtor's renunciation of a legacy or
devise. The first is the necessity of preventing state law from frustrating
the policies embodied in the Bankruptcy Act. The second is the need for
nationwide uniformity in administering the provisions of the Act.
Protecting the Policies of the Bankruptcy Act from State Interference
There is no clear rule to determine whether a particular issue arising
in bankruptcy is so central to the policies of the Bankruptcy Act that it
must be resolved by federal law.21 The question appears to depend upon
what section of the Act is involved and upon the specific facts of the case.
Although the general rule followed by the Supreme Court in bankruptcy
cases is to let state law control whenever possible,2" exceptions are made
in cases where a state law frustrates tlhe purposes or contradicts the ex-
press provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. In such cases, the state law is
held unconstitutional under the supremacy clause of the Constitution."3
For example, in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,2' a leading bankruptcy
case holding that federal law must prevail, the Supreme Court held that
a pre-bankruptcy assignment of wages by the debtor could not be en-
a Bankruptcy Act case, the Supreme Court stated:
It is a familiar doctrine that the prohibition of a federal statute may not be set
at naught, or its benefits denied, by state statutes or state common law rules.
In such a case our decision is not controlled by Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins ...
[The Erie doctrine] is inapplicable to those areas of judicial decision within
which the policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes
that legal relations which they affect must be deemed governed by federal law
having its source in those statutes, rather than by local law.
Id. at 176. This holding is consistent with other Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g.,
Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726 (1946) ; Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S.
89 (1941) ; Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941). See also Coun-
tryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 407, 409-11
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Countryman]. The author supports the application of fed-
eral law rather than state law in all areas of the Bankruptcy Act, arguing that Erie and
the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970), are not controlling where the Bank-
ruptcy Act is involved.
21. Some Supreme Court decisions have held that the Bankruptcy Act must over-
ride state law. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) ; Prudence Realization Corp. v.
Geist, 316 U.S. 89 (1941) ; Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934). Other cases
have held that state law should be followed whenever possible. McKenzie v. Irving
Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365 (1945); Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478
(1940).
22. E.g., Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940); Board of
Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1924).
23. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary not withstanding.
U.S. CoNsT. art. VI.
24. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
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forced by his creditor after he received a discharge in bankruptcy, despite
a state court decision to the contrary. The Court stated that a discharge
in bankruptcy abrogated all prior debts and rejected the state court's deci-
sion "as being destructive of the purpose and spirit of the Bankruptcy
Act."25 The Court also stated that "courts of bankruptcy are essentially
courts of equity, and their proceedings inherently proceedings in
equity.""8 As such, the bankruptcy courts may use their equity powers
to override state law where an equitable claim is established.
In 1971, the Supreme Court reinforced Local Loan Co. v. Hunt in
Perez v. Campbell.27 In that case, the Court declared unconstitutional a
state driver responsibility statute" because it allowed post-bankruptcy
sanctions for debts discharged in bankruptcy. The statute permitted
the restriction of driving privileges of people who had not paid auto-
mobile accident judgments against them even when the judgment debt
had been discharged. The decision reversed two prior cases which had
upheld similar statutes as furthering a valid state interest in promoting
highway safety.29 In Perez, the Court held that a valid state interest
would no longer be sufficient to save the statute if it interfered with the
full effectiveness of the federal Bankruptcy Act in providing complete
nullification of pre-bankruptcy debts?'° The Court added that this result
would be the same even though the state's purpose in passing the statute
was other than frustration of the Act.8 It is helpful to apply the
Supreme Court's analysis in Local Loan and Perez to the facts in the
Hoecker case.
Hoecker presents a situation where state law frustrates the Bank-
ruptcy Act policy of protecting the interests of creditors. The Act gives
the trustee the power to collect the bankrupt's assets, including those
which were transferred to avoid his creditors. 2 Since the state law in
25. Id. at 245.
26. Id. at 240.
27. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
28. Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-1163(B) (1956).
29. Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 173-74 (1962) ; Reitz v.
Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 36-37 (1941).
30. 402 U.S. at 651-52. The Court used a two-step process in determining whether
a state law can stand when it covers the same area as a federal statute: (1) Ascertain
the construction of both statutes; (2) Determine the constitutional question of whether
they are in conflict. Id. at 644. Applying this test, the Court found, id. at 652, that Ari-
zona's goal of protecting the highway-using public from financial hardship caused by
irresponsible persons conflicted with the federal goal of giving debtors a "'new opportun-
ity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discourage-
ment of preExisting debt." Id. at 648, quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,
244 (1934).
31. 402 U.S. at 652.
32. Bankruptcy Act § 67(d) (6), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (6) (1970).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Hoecker allowed the disclaimer to relate back and thus treated the
property as having never vested, the disclaimant could use the state law
to deplete the assets available to the creditors. By permitting this result,
the state law frustrated the purpose embodied in § 67(d) (2) of pre-
venting the debtor's pre-bankruptcy dissipation of assets. The Supreme
Court clearly established in Local Loan" and Perez" that a state law
which frustrates a purpose of the Bankruptcy Act cannot be allowed to
stand in federal bankruptcy proceedings. Hence, a bankruptcy court is
obliged to disregard the state law and to treat the issue as a federal ques-
tion.
This conclusion is more specifically supported by two Supreme Court
cases directly interpreting the terms "property" and "transfer" within the
context of the federal-state conflict.3 5
Usually the federal courts follow state law to determine what con-
stitutes property and how it can be owned" since there is no federal law
of property. But in Board of Trade v. Johnson,"7 the Supreme Court held
that a seat on the Chicago Board of Trade was property within the mean-
ing of the Bankruptcy Act despite a prior contrary decision by the
Supreme Court of Illinois.s The United States Supreme Court found the
state rule to be inconsistent with other Supreme Court decisions regard-
ing similar membership situations.3 9
[W]here the bankrupt law deals with property rights which are
regulated by the state law, the federal courts in bankruptcy
will follow the state courts; but when the language of Congress
indicates a policy requiring a broader construction of the . . .
[Bankruptcy Act] than the state decisions would give it, federal
courts can not be concluded by them.4"
In the second case, McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co.,4 the Court had
to determine if the bankrupt had given an unlawful preference under §
33. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
34. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
35. McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365 (1945) ; Board of Trade v. John-
son, 246 U.S. 1 (1924).
36. McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365 (1945); Demorest v. City Bank
Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36 (1944) ; Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309
U.S. 478 (1940).
37. 246 U.S. 1 (1924).
38. Barclay v. Smith, 107 Ill. 349 (1883).
39. 264 U.S. at 9. The prior decisions were Sparhawk v. Yerkes, 142 U.S. 1 (1891)
(memberships in the New York and Philadelphia stock exchanges) ; Hyde v. Woods, 94
U.S. 523 (1876) (ownership of a seat on the San Francisco Stock and Exchange Board).
40. 264 U.S. at 10 (emphasis added).
41. 323 U.S. 365 (1945).
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60(a) of the Act42 to one of his creditors. The controlling issue was
whether a transfer of money by check was complete at the time of receipt,
pursuant to state law, or at the date of mailing, according to federal law
as annunciated in the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 6 0(a). The
Court held:
What constitutes a transfer and when it is complete within
the meaning of § 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act is necessarily a
federal question, since it arises under a federal statute intended
to have uniform application throughout the United States.
43
Since § 1(30) defines the meaning of transfer for § 67(d) (2) as well
as § 60(a), McKenzie supports the conclusion that the meaning of
transfer is also a federal question under § 67(d) (2).
Thus, in a situation such as the one in Hoecker, the definitions of
the terms "interest in property" and "transfer" should be considered as
matters of federal law and should be dealt with in a manner that furthers
the policies of § 67(d) (2).
Need for Uniformity in Bankruptcy Law
A second reason favoring a federal rule to deal with the renunciation
problem is the need for a uniform application of the Bankruptcy Act
throughout the United States. The Constitution requires uniformity4 4
and the importance of this requirement has been stressed by the Supreme
Court.4" A number of policy considerations also support the use of
federal law rather than state law in bankruptcy courts. State laws de-
signed to affect debtor-creditor relations represent a wide variation in at-
titudes which are not consistent with a national bankruptcy law. Such
laws may have been drafted without regard for federal bankruptcy
policies or may even have been written with the specific intention of avoid-
ing federal bankruptcy law.' Other state laws, such as those concerning
wills and property, have been developed for reasons totally unrelated
to debtor-creditor relations and without concern for their im-
42. 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1970).
43. 323 U.S. at 369-70 (emphasis added).
44. U.S. CoxsT. art. I, § 8 states in part: "The Congress shall have Power . . .
To establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States." Id.
45. McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365 (1945); Prudence Realization
Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89 (1941); International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261
(1929); Warren v. Moody, 122 U.S. 132 (1887).
46. This was the case with the driver responsibility statute in Perez v. Campbell,
402 U.S. 637 (1971). ARIz. REV. STAT. AxN. § 28-1163(B) (1956) states: "A dis-
charge in bankruptcy following the rendering of any such judgment shall not relieve the
judgment debtor from any of the requirements of this article." Id.
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plications in bankruptcy. Furthermore, state laws may be infrequently
revised and thus ill-adapted to present-day bankruptcy situations. Reliance
on differing state laws makes a person's rights dependent on where he
lives. This may allow a party involved in a bankruptcy proceeding to seek
out state rules which will give him a financial advantage over the other
participants. The problem could be alleviated, and the requirements of
the Constitution and the Supreme Court complied with, by a uniform ap-
plication of federal bankruptcy law."
The precise issue here requiring uniform resolution is whether a
renunciation is a transfer under § 67(d) (2) of the Bankruptcy Act."8
State law cannot fulfill the need for uniformity because of the diversity
in the statutes and common law of the various states regarding renuncia-
tion of property passing by will or by intestate succession.
Some states apply the common law rule that the beneficiary of a will
may renounce the property to wjhich he is entitled even where the purpose
of the renunciation is to avoid creditors.49 There are, however, several
common exceptions to this rule. Renunciation to avoid creditors may be
prohibited where there has been collusion between the debtor and those
bene fitting by the disclaimer," or where the debtor has caused his
creditors to extend credit in reliance on his apparent acceptance of the
gift.5' Furthermore, renunciation of a devise must be made within a
reasonable time after the testator's death. If the devisee waits too long
to renounce, he may thereafter be prevented from doing so, but the time
limits vary from state to state. 2 Other states have chosen to reject the
47. Bankruptcy Act § 6, 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1970) ; see Countryman, supra note 20, at
475-76, where he argues for federal law even in the area of exemptions allowed to
debtors, where state statutes have traditionally been followed.
48. Professor James A. McLachlan (who changed his name from its original
spelling of McLaughlin), a leading authority on the Bankruptcy Act and one of the
draftsmen of the Chandler Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, which substantially
amended § 67(d) (2), now 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (2) (1970), was particularly insistent
that this section be applied as federal law and not according to the law of the individual
states. See McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 4
U. CmI. L. REv. 369, 385-86 (1937). See also McLaughlin, Application of the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 46 HARv. L. REv. 404 (1933).
49. See, e.g., Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Ia. 474, 187 N.W. 20 (1922) ; Carter v.
Carter, 63 N.J. Eq. 726, 53 A. 160 (1902); Bradford v. Calhoun, 120 Tenn. 53, 109
S.W. 502 (1908).
50. Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Ia. 474, 187 N.W. 20 (1922); Bradford v. Cal-
houn, 120 Tenn. 53, 109 S.W. 502 (1908).
51. Lehr v. Switzer, 213 Ia. 658, 239 N.W. 564 (1931) ; Daniel v. Frost, 62 Ga.
697 (1879).
52. A delay of a few months has been held to be reasonable. Suverkrup v. Suver-
krup, 106 Ind. App. 406, 18 N.E.2d 488 (1939); Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Ia. 474,
187 N.W. 20 (1922). A delay of several years is usually too long. Strom v. Wood, 100
Kan. 556, 164 P. 1100 (1917). But at least one New York case has held that as little
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common law rule entirely, holding that renunciations are never permitted
where the effect is to defeat creditors.53
Not only do the various states differ in their rules for testamentary
renunciation, but many states have different rules for renunciation of
testamentary gifts than for renunciation of property acquired by intestacy.
If a decedent dies intestate, the common law rule is that his heir cannot
renounce the property that he receives by inheritance."4 If the heir at--
tempts to renounce, the property passes from him by release, contract,
estoppel or actual conveyance, but he cannot prevent the property from
vesting in him, at least for a short time.55
A further complication arises where the beneficiary of a will is also
an heir and would have received the same share of the estate by succession
had the testator died without a will.5" In cases of this nature, where the
beneficiary's creditors have attempted to attach property passing by devise,
it has been held that the devisee could not renounce the part of the property
he would have received as an heir, but he could renounce any additional
interest extended to him by the will -beyond the amount of the intestate
as ten months was unreasonably long and renunciation was not allowed. In re Wilson's
Estate, 298 N.Y. 398, 83 N.E.2d 852 (1949).
53. The California Supreme Court has clearly ruled that an insolvent debtor can-
not renounce a testamentary gift to avoid his creditors. In re Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d
807, 108 P.2d 401 (1940). A few other states seem to have taken a similar approach.
See, e.g., Kearley v. Crawford, 112 Fla. 43, 151 So. 293 (1933) ; Daniel v. Frost, 62 Ga.
697 (1879); Estate of Buckius, 4 Pa. Dist. 775 (1895). The California position has
been adopted by statute in Indiana. IND. CODE § 29-1-6-4 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. §
6-604" (1970). This statute states in pertinent'part:
At any time within three (3) months after the appointment of a personal repre-
sentative an heir or devisee may renounce his succession to all or any portion of
the real or personal property of a decedent . . . except that no such renuncia-
tion shall be effective if it is objected to . . . by a creditor of the heir or devisee
and if the court finds that the creditor is prejudiced thereby.
Id. (emphasis added).
54. Coomes v. Finegan, 233 Ia. 448, 7 N.W.2d 729 (1943) ; Bostian v. Milens, 239
Mo. App. 555, 193 S.W.2d 797 (1946) ; Annot., 170 A.L.1R 424 (1947). See generally 6
PAGE ON WiLLs, supra note 5, § 49.1.
55. Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
836 (1952) ; Estate of Smith, 103 Colo. 91, 83 P.2d 333 (1938).
In a case similar to Hoecker, an insolvent debtor attempted to renounce an inheri-
tance to keep it away from his creditors. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
referred the case to the state courts for a decision as to whether there had been a trans-
fer by the debtor. Milens v. Bostian, 139 F.2d 282 (8th Cir. 1943). The Missouri state
court held that the debtor could not renounce, since the property had passed by inheri-
tance and not by will. Bostian v. Milens, 239 Mo. App. 555, 193 S.W.2d 797 (1946).
Hefice, the attempted renunciation constituted a conveyance by the debtor and could be
set aside by the trustee under § 67(d) (2).
56. When this occurs, the doctrine of "worthier title" treats the property devised
as having passed by inheritance under the laws of intestacy rather than by will. Perkins
v. Isley, 224 N.C. 793, 32 S.E.2d 588 (1945). See generally 6 PAGE ON WiILs, supra note
5, § 49.3.
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share." But sometimes this distinction is merely ignored. 8
In summary, the law of the various states governing renunciation
follows no consistent pattern. Whether a renunciation constitutes a
transfer may vary significantly from state to state for reasons seemingly
arbitrary and irrelevant to bankruptcy proceedings. If it is determined,
as in the Hoecker case, that the property must actually "vest" in the
debtor under state law in order for there to be a transfer, the result
may differ from state to state depending upon whether the debtor's
ancestor dies with or without a will, or whether the gift in the will is
the same as the share which the heir would have received by intestacy,
or whether the heir has waited seven months or ten months to renounce
the gift to avoid his creditors. Hence, bankruptcy courts should develop
a federal law in this area in order to achieve the necessary uniformity.
FEDERAL TREATMENT OF RENUNCIATION BY AN
INSOLVENT DEBTOR IN BANKRUPTCY
The foregoing discussion indicates the need for a federal rule to
resolve the issue of whether the renunciation of a legacy or devise by an
insolvent debtor is a "transfer" under the Bankruptcy Act. Such a rule
is necessitated by the obvious conflict of some state rules with the
fundamental policies of the Act and by the desirability of uniformity
in the application of the Act throughout the land. Consideration must
now be given to what the federal rule should be.
Primarily, the federal rule should be designed to further the pur-
poses of § 67(d) (2) by treating a renunciation by an insolvent debtor
as a transfer. The renunciation can then be properly evaluated to deter-
mine whether the requisite elements are present to make it a fraudulent
transfer and thus voidable by the trustee." Unless a transfer is found,
the protection for creditors provided by § 67(d) (2) can never be utilized.
There are at least two possible avenues available to achieve the desired
result: (1) viewing the power over the disposition of property as an
interest in property and hence capable of being the subject of a transfer
within the definition of § 1(30); (2) disregarding state relation back
rules in determining whether there was a transfer.
57. McGarry v. Mathis, 226 Ia. 37, 282 N.W. 786 (1938) ; Lehr v. Switzer, 213
Ia. 658, 239 N.W. 564 (1931).
58. Blake v. Blake, 147 Ore. 43, 31 P.2d 768 (1934).
59. If the transaction in Hoecker is defined by federal law to be a transfer, then it
is necessarily a fraudulent transfer under § 67(d) (2) since the facts are established that
the disclaimant received no consideration for the transfer and he was rendered insolvent
by it. See 476 F.2d at 839.
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Power over Disposition as a Transferable
Interest in Property
One possible approach is that of Judge Holloway's dissenting opinion
in Hoecker v. United Bank."0 He viewed the power to control the dis-
position of the property as a form of vested property interest in the
devisee, and considered the exercise of this power by renunciation to be a
"mode, direct or indirect," of disposing of or parting with an interest in
the property, and thus a transfer under the broad definition of § 1 (30).1
This approach, unlike state rules allowing renunciation to relate back,
would protect the interests of creditors while not directly contravening any
state law. A federal determination that the right to accept or renounce is
enough of a power to be considered an interest in property under the
Bankruptcy Act may co-exist with state rules concluding that the debtor's
possessory rights in the property have never vested. Thus, an exercise
of the power may be deemed a transfer and can be set aside by the trustee
if fraudulent.
A similar analysis has been utilized by the state courts in a number
of cases where the exercise of an optional power by the debtor has been
set aside as a fraudulent conveyance. Under the law of fraudulent con-
veyances, a release by the beneficiary of an equitable interest in a trust
has been held void as against his creditors. "2 Similarly, where a party
released attachments on the property of a third party with an intent to
defraud an attorney of his fee, the release was held fraudulent.63 It
has also been held that a refusal to exercise a valid option contract was
fraudulent and could be set aside.64 Some states hold that a creditor
may exercise a debtor's right to contest a will even if the debtor does
not wish to do so."5 In all of these examples, the conveyance involved
a power which could be exercised at the option of the debtor, but not a
possessory property interest. The power to accept or reject a devise is
an option of a similar nature. It would be consistent with these state
court decisions to conclude that the debtor's exercise of his option by
renunciation may be considered a transfer and may be set aside in bank-
ruptcy if fraudulent.
Additional support comes from provisions of the Bankruptcy Act
60. 476 F.2d 838, 842 (10th Cir. 1973).
61. Id. at 842.
62. Schaefer v. Fisher, 137 Misc. 420, 242 N.Y.S. 308 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
63. Buckley v. John, 314 Mass. 719, 51 N.E.2d 317 (1943).
64. Marsh v. Galbraith, 31 Tenn. App. 482, 216 S.W.2d 968 (1948).
65. Brooks v. Paine's Ex'r, 123 Ky. 271, 90 S.W. 600 (1906); In re Langevin's
Will, 45 Minn. 429, 47 N.W. 1133 (1891) ; Bloor v. Platt, 78 Ohio St. 46, 84 N.E. 604
(1908).
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dealing with optional rights in the debtor. In particular, the various pro-
visions of § 70(a) of the Act" vest in the trustee a number of powers
which the debtor might exercise for his own benefit, such as rights of
action upon contracts, rights of entry, and rights to patents, trademarks,
and possibilities of reverter. Section 70(c)6" also gives the trustee the
benefit of all meritorious defenses which the bankrupt might exercise
against third persons. These provisions are indicative of a congressional
policy to prevent the debtor from choosing an alternative which would
be detrimental to the estate. Similarly, treating the renunciation of a
legacy or devise by an insolvent debtor as a transfer furthers this policy
since it also prevents the debtor from depleting the estate.
In conclusion, there is ample authority for a federal court to treat
a renunciation by an insolvent debtor as a transfer. It clearly falls within
the Supreme Court's definition of transfer as including "every means and
manner by which property can pass from the ownership and possession
of another."6 " If the courts fail to interpret the Bankruptcy Act so as to
achieve this result, Congress should amend the Act, either to explicitly
include renunciation as a transfer or to give the trustee the debtor's
option to accept or renounce any inheritance, legacy or devise.6"
66. This section provides in part:
The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt . . . shall in turn be vested by operation
of law with the title of the bankrupt . . . to all of the following kinds of prop-
erty wherever located . . . (2) interests in patents, patent rights, copyrights,
and trademarks . . . (3) powers which he might have exercised for his own
benefit . . . (6) rights of action arising upon contracts, or usury, or the un-
lawful taking or detention of or injury to his property . . . (7) contingent
remainders, executory devises and limitations, rights of entry for condition
broken, rights or possibilities of reverter ....
11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970).
67. The trustee shall have the benefit of all defenses available to the bank-
rupt as against third persons, including statutes of limitations, statutes of frauds,
usury, and other personal defenses ....
11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970).
68. Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 182 U.S. 438, 444 (1901).
69. Although Congress has not specifically faced the problem of property received
by inheritance, legacy or devise before bankruptcy, it has dealt with property so received
after bankruptcy in the first full paragraph after clause (8) of § 70(a) :
All property, wherever located . . . which vests in the bankrupt within
six months after bankruptcy by bequest, devise or inheritance shall vest in the
trustee . . .as of the date when it vested in the bankrupt, and shall be free and
discharged from any transfer made or suffered by the bankrupt after bankruptcy.
11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970). While this provision faces the matter more directly than
§ 67(d) (2), it is not certain that the wording used would require that a renunciation be
set aside. That issue would still depend on whether state law or federal law determined
when the property vested in the bankrupt. There seem to be no cases which have faced
this question. But see Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 738 (1950).
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Prohibition of State Relation Back Rules in
Federal Bankruptcy Proceedings
An additional approach to the resolution of the problem of renunci-
ations by insolvent debtors is for the courts to adopt a policy of disre-
garding state relation back rules in the determination of whether a trans-
fer occurred under § 67(d) (2). The entire issue of renunciation to avoid
creditors could be settled more easily if it were not for such rules.
Standing alone, the renunciation of a devise creates no particular prob-
lems. There is a generally accepted rule that a beneficial devise or bequest
is presumed to be accepted until it is renounced.7" Given this presump-
tion, if a renunciation meets the § 67(d) (2) (a) criteria of present or
ensuing insolvency and absence of consideration and is made within one
year prior to bankruptcy, it is a fraudulent conveyance and can be set
aside. The problem is created by state rules which make the renuncia-
tion retroactive to the testator's death, with the effect that the property
is treated as having never vested in the beneficiary so that he has nothing
to transfer.
The concept of relation back has a number of useful and justifiable
applications in property law. It is a legal fiction which is used mainly for
administrative convenience or to achieve equity for a party who. might
otherwise be treated unfairly.7' In general, relation back is employed
to provide equitable protection for one party, but not by imposing any
unfair burdens on third parties.72 Renunciation of a testamentary gift
to avoid creditors is not analogous.78 In this situation, relation back
70. Peter v. Peter, 343 Ill. 493, 175 N.E. 846 (1931); Strom v. Wood, 100 Kan.
556, 164 P. 1100 (1917); Defreese v. Lake, 109 Mich. 415, 67 N.W. 505 (1896)
In re Waring, 293 N.Y. 186, 56 N.E.2d 543 (1944).
71. For example, upon delivery of a deed from escrow, the conveyance may be re-
lated back to the date when the deed was first placed in escrow in order to protect the
grantee's title where the grantor died while the deed was in escrow, Simpson v. Mc-
Glathery, 52 Miss. 723 (1876), Prutsman v. Baker, 30 Wis. 644 (1872), or to allow the
grantee to convey legal title while the deed was in escrow, Tooley v. Dibble, 2 Hill 641
(N.Y. 1842). Testamentary letters and letters of administration may be related back
to the testator's death in order to validate sales of the property of the estate made by
the executor before the will is admitted to probate, Wilson v. Wilson, 54 Mo. 213 (1873),
and to protect the executor from liability for acts committed in the interim for the bene-
fit of the estate, Nance v. Gray, 143 Ala. 234, 38 So. 916 (1904), see Annot., 26 A.L.R.
1359 (1923). One court applied relation back to the renunciation by the beneficiary of
an equitable interest in a trust in order to void the trust and prevent the property from
being seized by the Alien Property Custodian. Stoehr v. Miller, 296 F. 414 (2d Cir.
1923). Another court allowed the renunciation of a devise to relate back to the testator's
death so that the renouncing devisee would not be required to pay the state inheritance
tax. People v. Flanagin, 331 III. 203, 162 N.E. 848 (1928).
72. In re Kalt's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 812, 108 P.2d 401, 403 (1940) ; Wilson v.
Wilson, 54 Mo. 213, 216 (1873) ; Prutsman v. Baker, 30 Wis. 644, 649 (1872).
73. Some states have recognized the dissimilarity of the two situations and have
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does not protect the renouncing beneficiary, since he will lose the
property either to the creditors or to the other heirs or beneficiaries."
But there is damage to the creditors, who are losing the opportunity to
collect legitimate debts. The only ones benefitting from the relation
back rule are the next heirs or beneficiaries, who are receiving a wind-
fall gain at the expense of the creditors. Unfortunately, many courts
apply the rule in this situation without noticing that its normal justifica-
tions are not present. As a result, a rule founded on mere convenience
has been allowed to become an instrument of injustice to creditors. As
one commentator has stated:
It must be apparent . . that the doctrine which causes a
renunciation to relate back so as to be operative from the
moment of the deceased's death is largely conceptual, and its
indiscriminate application may frequently lead to an inequit-
able result.75
Within the context of the. Bankruptcy Act itself, there is authority
for disregarding state relation back rules. Section 67(a)"6 deals with
judicial liens, which are voidable if they attach to the debtor's property
within four month prior to bankruptcy.77 While state law is used to
determine the date when the lien attaches,7 it is generally held that state
rules permitting relation back are not applicable." An invalid lien at-
taching within the four-month period cannot be protected by having it
relate back to the start of a proceeding"0 or the entry of a judgment8 '
taken appropriate steps to prevent relation back rules from working an injustice to credi-
tors. See authorities cited note 53 supra.
74. Admittedly, the devisee is not a disinterested party since he would probably
prefer to have the property pass to his family members, but an overt desire to accom-
plish this could be construed as actual fraud and thus voidable under § 67(d) (2) (d), 11
U.S.C. § 107(d) (2) (d) (1970). Transfers among family members are usually suspect
and sometimes prima facie fraudulent. See McWilliams v. Edmondson, 162 F.2d 454
(5th Cir. 1947).
A given situation may involve both a renunciation to avoid creditors and an intent
to benefit family members, but the two issues are not identical. While a renunciation
could be set aside because of actual fraud if the transaction was intended to benefit
family members by avoiding creditors, this note provides more general methods for
dealing with renunciations which apply regardless of whether the next takers are family
members or total strangers.
75. Note, Renunciation of Testamentary Gift to Defeat Clahns of Devisee's Credi-
tors, 43 YALE L.J. 1030, 1032 (1934). See also 37 MIC. L. REv. 1168 (1939).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1970).
77. See generally 4 COLLIER, supra note 7, ff 67.04.
78. See, e.g., McLeod v. Cooper, 88 F.2d 194 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 705
(1937) ; Reilly v. Sabin, 81 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1935).
79. In re Darwin, 117 F. 407 (6th Cir. 1902); In re Laskaris, 4 F. Supp. 652
(W.D.N.Y. 1933); In re Prunotto, 51 F.2d 602 (W.D.N.Y. 1931).
80. It re Van Meter, 135 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Ark. 1955).
81. Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426 (1924).
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which occurred prior to the four-month period.
Similarly, § 60(a) 2 deals with illegal preferences extended to
favored creditors by the bankrupt within four months prior to bank-
ruptcy. An early Supreme Court case had held that a debtor's pledge
of stocks and bonds within four months prior to bankruptcy related
back to his promise to pledge made prior to the four-month period."8
Hence, the pledge was not an illegal preference. By amendments in
1938 and 1950, Congress rejected this holding by specifically prohibiting
the use of the relation back rule in § 60(a) cases.8" These amendments
evidence a congressional policy against permitting relation back rules to
frustrate the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.
Relation back is a legal fiction which creates an injustice when it
is used to permit a debtor's renunciation to avoid his creditors. Pro-
bibiting the use of the rule under § 67(d) (2) does not contravene any
compelling state interest, and there is congressional and judicial support
for this approach.
CONCLUSION
In actions under the Bankruptcy Act, the renunciation of an inheri-
tance, legacy or devise by an insolvent debtor should be treated as a
matter of federal law, either by defining the power to control the disposi-
tion of property as a transferable property right to bring it within the
purview of § 67(d) (2) or else by proscribing the application of the rela-
tion back rule to renunciations by insolvent debtors. Bankruptcy courts,
if they are to perform their duty to uphold the spirit and purpose of the
Bankruptcy Act, should adopt one of these solutions. There is ample
authority for both under the case law as well as by analogy to other
related areas of the Bankruptcy Act. However, if the courts are inclined
to follow nonuniform and often inequitable state rules in this area, then
the change should come through a congressional amendment to the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
DAVID E. LEIGH
82. 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1970).
83. Sexton v. Kessler, 225 U.S. 90 (1912).
84. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840; Act of Mar. 18, 1950, ch. 70, 64
Stat. 24; see H.R. REP. No. 1293, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). However, congressional
action is not necessarily required to achieve this result. The congressional attitude evi-
denced by the 1938 and 1950 amendments are supportive of judicial action in this area
as well. See cases cited notes 79-81 supra, where the courts disregarded relation back
rules without specific statutory authorization.
